)
What 5s the right use of the will of a rational being? "Such which can stand under the principle of the System of all ends. general system of ends is only possible according to the idea of morality." Therefore the legitimate use of reason is to act according to the moral law (172) . "Morality is the absolutely necessary System of all ends, and precisely the fitting together with the idea of a System 2 ) of all ends is the basis of the morality of an action" (133). Only in so far äs rational creatures can be regarded äs members of this general system have they a personal worth. "For a good will is something good in and for itself and therefore absoiutely good" (173).
God's wisdom is "perfection of knowledge in the derivation of every end from the System of all ends." One can only understand wisdom in man äs the unifying (Zusammenhang) of all our ends with morality (104). Here we are concerned with absolute ends (172), but in the case of happiness with contingent ends (133). With happiness the part cannot be deduced from the whole, for the concept of happiness admits no concept of a whole. But "morality has precisely for its consideration, how every end can stand together with the whole of all ends, and judges all actions äs general rules." "Man has an idea of the whole of all ends, although he never fully attains to it" (105). In this system all rational creatures are reciprocal ends and means (177). 3) "The whole world 5s considered äs a universal system of all ends, äs well through nature äs freedom" (177). "Man acts according to the *) References are to the first edition.
2 ) Also called a Kingdom, s ) See also 178, idea of freedom, äs if he was free, and eo ipso ia free." Without freedom there would be no morality (121).
Our duty we judge from the possibility of a System of all ends -from the idea of the whole of all ends we determine the worth of every end -and we can be äs sure of our duty äs that a triangle must have three angles (200) . "An action is bad, if the universality of the principle, according to which it is done, is contrary to reason" (134). "If all men speak the trutb, a System of ends is possible among them, but äs soon äs only one lies, already bis end does not harmonize with the others. Therefore there is also the universal rule, according to which the morality of an action is judged always thus: if all human beings should do it, would then also a unity (Zusammenhang) of ends be possible?" (173). -God alone is holy, but man can be virtuous. Virtue consists in self-mastery. God is "äs it were the moral law itself, only thought äs personified."
The difference in the presentation of Kant's Ethics in these Lectures from that in the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason" is patent. Here the starting point is the idea of the end, of the System of all ends. That System is the foundation thought. Such a System is only possible through morality. Therefore the only legitimate use of reason is to act according to the moral law. Teleology is the guiding consideration.
This difference of treatment between it and the other ethical books of the eighties is partly the result, I judge, of the theological cast of the book. One discussion of ethics comes under the heading of the wisdom of God. He knows the System of all ends. In what then consists the wisdom of man? It is in the harmonizing of our ends with morality, for morality is concerned with the idea of the whole of all ends.
Another discussion, which is very important, is under the topic of creation. The end of creation is the perfection of the world. This consists in the use rational creatures make of their reason and freedom. What is the right use? That by which a general System of ends is possible.
Certainly it is interesting to find in Kant such a teleological treatment of ethics, which even deduces from the idea of a System of all ends the idea of morality. The method is the reverse of that in the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics ", where the start is from the will good without qualification, and the movement is toward the Kingdom of ends.
In my previous article I remarked on the formula according to which one is " always" to judge of the worth of an action, viz., whether it admits of a unity of ends. The other Statement is to be noted, that "an action is bad, if the universality of the principle, according to which it is done, is contrary to reason".
